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Abstract
We study mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer deterministic concurrent games played
on graphs, with terminal-reward payoffs (that is, absorbing states with a value for each player).
We show undecidability of the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium (the constraint requir-
ing that one player should have maximal payoff), with only three players and 0/1-rewards (i.e.,
reachability objectives). This has to be compared with the undecidability result by Ummels and
Wojtczak for turn-based games which requires 14 players and general rewards. Our proof has vari-
ous interesting consequences: (i) the undecidability of the existence of a Nash equilibrium with
a constraint on the social welfare; (ii) the undecidability of the existence of an (unconstrained)
Nash equilibrium in concurrent games with terminal-reward payoffs.
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1 Introduction
Games (especially games played on graphs) have been intensively used in computer science as
a powerful way of modelling interactions between several computerised systems [11, 8]. Until
recently, more focus had been put on the study of purely antagonistic games (a.k.a. zero-sum
games, where the aim of one player is to prevent the other player from achieving her objective),
which conveniently model systems evolving in a (hostile) environment.
Over the last ten years, games with non-zero-sum objectives have come into the picture:
they allow for conveniently modelling complex infrastructures where each individual system
tries to fulfill its own objectives, while still being subject to actions of the surrounding
systems. As an example, consider (a simplified version of) the team formation problem [4],
an example of which is presented in Fig. 1: several agents are trying to achieve tasks; each
task requires some resources, which are shared by the players. Achieving a task thus requires
the formation of a team that have all required resources for that task: each player selects
the task she wants to achieve (and so proposes her resources for achieving that task), and
if a task receives enough resources, the associated team receives the corresponding payoff
(to be divided among the players in the team). In such a game, there is a need of cooperation
(to gather enough resources), and an incentive to selfishness (to maximise the payoff).
In that setting, focusing only on optimal strategies for one single agent is not relevant.
In game theory, several solution concepts have been defined, which more accurately represents
rational behaviours of these multi-player systems; Nash equilibrium [9] is the most prominent
such concept: a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (that is, one strategy to each player)
where no player can improve her own payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. In other
terms, in a Nash equilibrium, each individual player has a satisfactory strategy with regards
to the other players’ strategies. Notice that Nash equilibria need not exist or be unique,
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1
2 ,
1
2 1, 0
A1 → T1, A2 → T1
A1 → T2, A2 → T2
A1 → T1, A2 → T2
A1 → T2, A2 → T1
player A1 has resources {r1, r2, r3}
player A2 has resources {r2, r3}
task T1 requires resources {r1, r2}
task T2 requires resources {r1, r3}
Figure 1 An instance of the team-formation problem. For any deterministic choice of actions,
one of the players has an incentive to change her choice: there is no pure Nash equilibrium. However
there is one mixed Nash equilibrium, where each player plays T1 and T2 uniformly at random.
and are not necessarily optimal: Nash equilibria where all players lose may coexist with
more interesting Nash equilibria. Therefore, looking for constrained Nash equilibria (e.g.
equilibria in which some players are required to win, or equilibria with maximal social welfare)
is an interesting and important problem to study, which has been suggested both in the
game-theory community [5] and in the computer-science community [12].
In this paper, we study (deterministic) concurrent games played on graphs. Such games
are indeed a general and relevant model for interactive systems, where the agents take their
decision simultaneously (which is the case for instance in distributed systems). Concurrent
games subsume turn-based games, where in each state, only one player has the decision for the
next move, and which have attracted more focus until now in the computer science community.
Notice also that in game theory, models are almost exclusively based on concurrent actions
(e.g. games in normal form given as matrices indicating the payoff of each player for each
concurrent choice of actions, and extensions thereof, such as repeated games).
In this paper we are interested in randomized (a.k.a. mixed) strategies for the players.
A mixed strategy consists in choosing, at each step of the game, a probability distribution
over the set of available actions; the game then proceeds following the product distribution
of the strategies of all players. Strategies may depend on the history of the game, i.e., the
sequence of visited states, but do not require to see the actions played by the other agents.
In previous works, the first two authors have focused on pure strategies, where at each step,
each player proposes exactly one action, and developed algorithms for deciding the existence
of constrained Nash equilibria in various settings [1]. In the present paper, we focus on
terminal-reward payoffs (where some designated states are absorbing, and each player has
a value—or reward—attached to each of these states): the payoff of a player is then her
expected reward. We will also consider the subclass of games with terminal-reachability
objectives, where the reward in each absorbing state is either 0 or 1 (hence the expected
reward for a player is the probability to reach her winning states). The game in Fig. 1 has
terminal-reward payoffs: they are given by the values labelling the two absorbing states (1 for
player A1 and 0 for player A2 in the right-most state). This game can be shown to have no
pure-strategy Nash equilibria, but it has a mixed-strategy one.
Our results. Our main result is the undecidability of the existence of a 0-optimal Nash
equilibrium in concurrent games with terminal-reachability payoff functions, with only
three players and strategies insensitive to actions. A 0-optimal Nash equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium in which one designated player is required to have maximal payoff (that is, 1 in
the case of terminal-reachability payoffs). A corollary of our result is the undecidability of
the existence of unconstrained Nash equilibria in concurrent games with terminal payoffs.
We believe that these results are important, as they solve natural questions for basic objectives.
Moreover, our constructions give new insight in the understanding of concurrent games and
their algorithmics, and contain several intermediary tools that can be interesting on their
own in different contexts.
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Several results already exist in related settings:
our result should first be compared with the undecidability of the existence of a 0-optimal
Nash equilibrium in turn-based games with terminal-reward payoffs[13], which requires
14 players and general rewards. It should be noticed that this result requires more than
0/1 rewards (contrary to our result), since the existence of a 0-optimal equilibrium can
be decided in polynomial time in turn-based games with terminal-reachability payoffs
(by combining the reduction to pure 0-optimal Nash equilibria of [12] and the algorithm
in [13] for computing such equilibria);
our result should also be compared with polynomial-time algorithm for deciding the
existence of a 0-optimal pure Nash equilibrium in concurrent terminal-reward games [15];
our result has several corollaries, that we develop at the end of the paper:
the existence of a (unconstrained) Nash equilibrium in terminal-reward games with
three players; on the opposite, stationary -Nash equilibria do always exist in concurrent
games for terminal-reachability (and terminal-reward) games [3];
the existence of a Nash equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare in games
with terminal-reachability payoffs is undecidable with three players. This should be
compared with the NP-completeness of the existence of such equilibria for two-player
normal-form games [6];
the existence of a constrained finite-memory Nash equilibrium in terminal-reachability
games is undecidable with three players;
the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium in safety games is undecidable with
three players. This can be compared to the result of [10], which states that there
always exists a Nash equilibrium (with little memory) in a safety game.
By lack of space, only some sketches of proofs could be included in this paper. We refer
the interested reader to [2] for full details.
2 Definitions
I Definition 1. A concurrent arena A is a tuple A = 〈States,Agt,Act,Tab, (Allowi)i∈Agt〉
where States is a finite set of states; Agt is a finite set of players; Act is a finite set of actions;
For all i ∈ Agt, Allowi : States −→ 2Act\{∅} is a function describing authorized actions in a
given state for Player i; Tab : States× ActAgt → States is the transition function.
A state s ∈ States is said terminal (or final) if Tab(s, ·) ≡ s. We write FA (or simply F
when the underlying arena is clear from the context) for the set of terminal states of A.
A history of such an arena A is a finite, non-empty word h ∈ States+. We denote
by first(h) and last(h) respectively the first and last states of the word h. During a play,
players in Agt choose their next moves concurrently and independently from each others,
according to the current history h and what they are allowed to do in the current state last(h).
I Definition 2. A strategy for Player i is a function σi : States+ → Dist(Act) with the
requirement that σi(h)−1(R>0) ⊆ Allowi(last(h)) for all history h.
Let α ∈ Act. We write σi(α | h) for the probability mass σi(h)(α) of action α in the
distribution σi(h). In the sequel, we sometimes write σi(h) = α when σi(α | h) = 1. When
σi(h) ∈ Act for all h, the strategy σi for player i is said to be pure. Otherwise it is said to
be mixed. We denote by Si (resp. Si) the set of pure (resp. mixed) strategies of Player i.
A strategy profile σ is a mapping assigning one strategy to each player. We write S for the
set of all strategy profiles, and for σ ∈ S, we will write σi in place of σ(i) for the strategy of
Player i.
FSTTCS 2014
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I Remark. While strategies are aware of the sequence of actions played in a turn-based game,
we can notice this is generally not the case in the concurrent setting depicted here, since
strategies only depend on the sequence of visited states. This is realistic when considering
multi-agent systems, where only the global effect of the actions of the players is assumed to
be observable. However this partial-information hypothesis makes the detection of strategy
deviations (and therefore the computation of Nash equilibria) harder.
Consider a strategy profile σ ∈ S and an initial state s0. For any history h ∈ States+ and
any player i ∈ Agt, we construct the random variable αi(h) ∈ Act with distribution σi(h)
such that (αi(h))i∈Agt,h∈States+ is a family of independent random variables.
We define the stochastic process (Xn)n∈N inductively by X0 = s0 and for every n,
Xn+1 = Xn · Tab (last(Xn), (αi(Xn))i). For each n, the random variable Xn takes value in
Statesn+1: (Xn)n is an increasing sequence of prefixes whose limit is an infinite random run
X∞ ∈ Statesω.
We now consider the standard Borel σ-algebra over Statesω from s0, and define the
probability measure Pσ as the probability distribution induced by X∞, that is, if B is a Borel
subset of Statesω, Pσ(B) = P(X∞ ∈ B). It coincides with the standard construction based
on cylinders. In the following, to make explicit the initial state, we may write Pσ(B | s0)
instead of simply Pσ(B). In the sequel, we sometimes also abusively write h for the cylinder
h · Statesω: then, when we write Pσ(h | s0), we mean Pσ(X|h| = h). If Pσ(h | s0) > 0,
we say that σ enables h from s0: in that case we can define the conditional probability
Pσ(B | h) = Pσ(B | X|h| = h).
Finally we say that a node n is activated by a strategy profile whenever it is visited with
positive probability under that profile.
I Definition 3. A terminal-reward game G = 〈A, s, (φi)i∈Agt〉 is given by an arena A,
an initial state s, and for every player i ∈ Agt, a real-valued function φi ranging over terminal
states of A. In the following, we extend φi to every r ∈ Statesω, by φi(r) = φi(s) if r is an
infinite path ending in a state s ∈ F, and φi(r) = 0 otherwise.
The game G will be said a terminal-reachability game whenever each function φi only
takes values 0 or 1.
I Remark. In the sequel, we represent terminal-reward games as graphs with circle states
representing non-terminal states, and rectangle states representing terminal states, decorated
with the associated rewards for all players. The self-loop on terminal states will be omitted.
The transition table of the underlying arena is encoded by decorating the transitions with the
move vectors that trigger it. Move vectors are written as words over Act, by identifying Agt
with the subset J0, |Agt| − 1K. We will use · as a special symbol representing any action. Also,
for a set S of words in (Act∪{·})k, with k < |Agt|, and for a letter a ∈ Act∪{·}, we write aS
for the words {aw | w ∈ S}. See Fig. 2 (and the subsequent figures) for an example.
Consider a terminal-reward game G, a strategy profile σ, and an enabled history h.
One can easily check that φi is a mesurable function under Pσ. The expected payoff of
Player i under σ after h is defined as
Eσ(φi | h) =
∑
x∈Img(φi)
x · Pσ (φ−1i ({x}) | h) .
In case G is a terminal-reachability game, the expected payoff of Player i is the probability
of reaching terminal states with value 1 under φi.
Let G be a terminal-reward game. Let σ ∈ S be a (mixed) strategy profile in G, and h be
a history. A single-player deviation (simply called deviation hereafter, as we only consider
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deviations of a single player at a time) of σ for Player i after history h is another strategy
profile σ′ for which there exists σ′′i ∈ Si satisfying
∀h′ ∈ States+.
{
h v h′ ⇒ σ′i(h′) = σ′′i (h′)
∀j ∈ Agt. (h 6v h′ ∨ j 6= i)⇒ σ′j(h′) = σj(h′)
where v is the prefix relation. We then write σ′ = σ[i/σ′′i ]h. The deviation σ[i/σ′′i ]h is said
deterministic if σ′′i is.
I Definition 4. Let G be a terminal-reward game. A strategy profile σ forms a Nash
equilibrium after a history h when the following conditions are met:
h ∈ States+ is enabled by σ from first(h);
No player has a profitable deviation; in other terms, for all i ∈ Agt and for all σ′i ∈ Si,
it holds Eσ[i/σ′i]h(φi | h) ≤ Eσ(φi | h).
We then write that 〈σ, h〉 is a Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium 〈σ, h〉 is said 0-optimal whenever the expected payoff of Player 0 is
optimal, that is, Eσ(φi | h) = max(Img(φ0)). In case of a terminal-reachability game, it
amounts to saying that the payoff of Player 0 is 1.
The following result will be useful all along the paper:
I Lemma 5. Let G be a terminal-reward game, and 〈σ, h〉 be a Nash equilibrium. If 〈σ, h〉
enables h′, then 〈σ, h′〉 is a Nash equilibrium.
In general, several Nash equilibria may coexist. It is therefore very relevant to look for
constrained Nash equilibria, that is, Nash equilibria that satisfy a constraint on the expected
payoff. In this paper, we only consider 0-optimality as the constraint, and we prove that
the existence of a 0-optimal Nash equilibrium in a three-player terminal-reachability game is
undecidable. To prove this result, we will first show undecidability in the case of terminal-
reward games, and then extend the result to terminal-reachability games. Those results will
have interesting corollaries, like the undecidability of the existence of a Nash equilibrium
(with no constraint) in terminal-reward games, when the rewards are in {−1, 0, 1}, or the
existence of a Nash equilibrium with optimal social welfare.
3 Tools
In this section, we develop several intermediary results that will be useful for our reduction.
We first show that we can equivalently define Nash equilibria by considering only deterministic
deviations (for non-negative terminal-reward games). We then study a few simple games
and constructions which will be used in the encoding.
3.1 Deterministic deviations
We explain in this section that it is enough to consider deterministic deviations in the
characterization of a Nash equilibrium.
I Proposition 6. Let G be a terminal-reward game with non-negative rewards. Pick a history
h ∈ States+, and a strategy profile σ. Then 〈σ, h〉 is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, for
all i ∈ Agt and all deterministic deviation σ′′i ∈ Si, it holds Eσ[i/σ
′′
i ]
h(φA | h) ≤ Eσ(φi | h).
I Remark. A similar result was proven in [15, Proposition 3.1] for turn-based games with
qualitative Borel objectives (the payoff is 1 if the run belongs to the designed objective, and
it is 0 otherwise).
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s0
c0, b1 a0, a1 d0, d1 b0, c1
mn
mm
nm
nn
(a) A generic two-player two-action one-stage game
m
n
m n01
a0, a1 b0, c1
c0, b1 d0, d1
(b) Associated matrix represent-
ation
Figure 2 Representations of a one-shot game.
3.2 One-stage games
We analyse two-player two-action one-stage games (that is, games that end up in a terminal
state in one step), and obtain useful properties of their Nash equilibria. Such games can
be represented by a graph as shown in Fig. 2a. Alternatively, these games, also known
as one-shot games, can be represented as a matrix as in Table 2b (this is the standard
representation in the game-theory community).
I Lemma 7. Consider the two-player two-action one-shot concurrent game G of Fig. 2, and
pick some strategy profile σ. If 〈σ, s0〉 is a Nash equilibrium, then for every player i ∈ {0, 1},
it holds{
σi(m | s0) < 1 ⇒ [(di − ci) + (ai − bi)] · σ1−i(m | s0) ≤ di − ci
σi(m | s0) > 0 ⇒ [(di − ci) + (ai − bi)] · σ1−i(m | s0) ≥ di − ci
3.3 k-action matching-pennies games
s0
a0, a1 b0, b1
6=k=k
Figure 3 Matching-pennies game.
The classical matching-pennies games are a special
case of one-stage games, where ai = di and bi =
ci: basically, there are two outcomes, depending on
whether the players propose the same action or not.
This game can be generalized to k (≥ 2) actions, as
depicted on Fig. 3. In this figure (and in the sequel),
=k (resp. 6=k) is a shorthand for pairs of identical (resp.
different) actions taken from a set of k actions Σk =
{c1, . . . , ck}. In other terms, =k represents the set of words {cici | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, and 6=k is the
complement in Σ2k.
I Lemma 8. In the k-action matching-pennies game, playing uniformly at random for both
players defines a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, this is the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game if, and only if, either a0 < b0 and a1 > b1, or a0 > b0 and a1 < b1. The payoff of this
Nash equilibrium is
( 1
k · a0 +
(
1− 1k
) · b0, 1k · a1 + (1− 1k) · b1).
3.4 Games without equilibrium
In this section, we show that there are games that admit no Nash equilibria. We then explain
how these games can be used to impose constraints on payoffs.
Consider the game hide-or-run, depicted in Fig. 4a. Player 0 can either hide (h) or run
home (r), while Player 1 can either shoot him (s), or wait (w). If Player 1 shoots while
Player 0 is hiding, she loses her bullet and loses the game. If Player 1 shoots when Player 0
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1,−1 −1, 1
hs, rw rs
hw
(a) H has no Nash equilibria
2, 0 0, 2
hs, rw rs
hw
(b) H′ does have a Nash
equilibrium
Figure 4 Hide-or-run games.
s′0 GH continue s0
stop
Figure 5 A game that has a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, G has a 0-optimal Nash equilibrium.
is running, she wins. This game has been shown to have no optimal almost-sure strategy [7],
and we adapt the proof to show that it has no Nash equilibria.
I Lemma 9. The game H has no Nash equilibria.
The payoff function of H takes negative value. In order to only have nonnegative payoffs,
we could shift the values by 1, which yields the game H′ depicted on Fig. 4b. But then one
easily sees that the strategies σ0(h | sn0 ) = 1 and σ1(s | sn0 ) = 1 form a Nash equilibrium,
contrary to a claim in [3, 13]. The difference is that when shifting the payoffs, we did not
modify the payoff of the run that never reaches a terminal state: while this run was a positive
deviation for Player 1 in H, this is not the case in H′ anymore.
We now explain how we use the game H to impose a 0-optimality constraint on the payoff.
In the sequel, we restrict1 to games where maxs∈F φ0(s) = 1. Then:
I Lemma 10. Let G be a terminal-reward game. Then we can build a terminal-reward
game G′ (see Fig. 5) such that G has a 0-optimal Nash equilibrium if, and only if, G′ has a
Nash equilibrium.
This lemma will be useful for extending the undecidability result from the constrained
existence to the existence problem (Corollary 14).
I Remark. Note that in the above construction, game H can be replaced by any game with
no Nash equilibria, such that Player 0 can secure a payoff 1− ε for every ε > 0. For instance,
one could use a game with limit-average payoff and nonnegative rewards only [14].
4 Updating values
Our undecidability proof will be based on an encoding of a two-counter machine. In this
section and in the next one, we present games that will be building blocks for our proof.
Consider the game Grk depicted on Fig. 6: in this game, Player 0 has two available actions a
and b from s0, sk and sl, while the other two players can either continue (action c), or
1 This is no loss of generality, since we can linearly rescale payoffs of each player without changing
profitable deviations.
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s0
sk
0, 4, 4
bS
0, 5 + k, 3− k
aS
1, 4 + k, 4− k
acc
acc
0, 5, 3
aS
0, 4, 4
bS
sl
1, 4 + l, 4− l
acc
0, 5 + l, 3− l
aS 0, 4, 4
bS
bcc
tk
bcc bcc
uk
0, 5, 3
0, 4, 4
·cs
·s·
·=k
·6=k
H
n : 1, 4 + x, 4− x ·cc
Figure 6 The rescale game Grk for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and l = k − 1.
unilateraly decide to stop the game (action s) and go to a terminal state (where Player 0 will
have payoff 0). In node tk, only players 1 and 2 have a choice: they can either continue to the
game H (when both of them play c), or decide to stop and go to a k-action matching-pennies
game (when one of them plays s). In Fig. 6, we write S as a shorthand representing any
combination of moves of players 1 and 2 where at least one of them decides to stop (action s).
Node n is the initial node of a game H (which is unknown for the moment).
The interesting property of game Grk is that we can relate 0-optimal Nash equilibria
from s0 and those from n: (roughly) there is a Nash equilibrium from n of expected payoff
(1, 4 + x, 4 − x) if, and only if, there is a Nash equilibrium from s0 of expected payoff
(1, 4 + k · x, 4− k · x).
This is because, from s0 and sk, there is a threat for Player 0 that one of the players 1
and 2 stops the game immediately, leading to a state with payoff 0 for her. Hence, Player 0
is forced to “collaborate” with players 1 and 2 and help them be satisfied with their payoffs,
either by joining one of the interesting terminal states of Grk, or in the next game H after n.
Some technical calculations show that Player 0 has to play a with probability k · x at s0, and
with probability x/(x+ 1) at sk and sl. The gadget to the right of tk is just for ensuring
that 0 ≤ k · x ≤ 1 (this condition is required for having the above-mentioned equivalence
between Nash equilibria from s0 and Nash equilibria from n).
5 Comparing values
5.1 Testing game
We present in this section the construction of a game for comparing the expected payoffs
in different nodes. This will be useful in our reduction to encode the zero-tests of our
two-counter machine.
Consider the game Gt depicted on Fig. 7. This game has the very interesting property
that if we assume there are 0-optimal Nash equilibria from n1 and n2 of respective payoffs
(1, 4 + x, 4− x) and (1, 4− y, 4 + y), then there is a 0-optimal Nash equilibrium from s0 if,
and only if, x = y, and the payoff is then (1, 4 + x/2, 4− x/2). Indeed, unless x = 0 or y = 0,
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s0
sa1
sb1
0, 4, 4
sa2
sb2
H2 H1
n2 : 1, 4− y, 4 + y n1 : 1, 4 + x, 4− x
·ab
·ba
·S
·S
·cc
·cc
·6=2
·6=2
·=2
·=2
·=2
Figure 7 The testing game Gt.
s0
s21, 3, 5 1, 4, 4
s1
·aa ·ba
·ab
·bb
·6=k
·=k
game Ck: s0
s2 0, 3, 51, 3, 5 1, 4, 4
s1
·aa ·ba
·ab
·bb acc, bS
aS
bcc
game D:
Figure 8 The modules Ck (for k ≥ 2) and D. Notice that state s2 should be considered terminal,
as it only carries a self-loop. We could replace it by a two-state loop. We could also see it as a
terminal state with reward (0, 0, 0), but for the proof of Corollary 16, we want the terminal rewards
of players 1 and 2 to always sum to 8, which we could not achieve easily in this case.
it should be the case that a 0-optimal Nash equilibrium activates all states sαj in the game,
and then, as players 1 and 2 have zero-sum objectives, the best way is to play uniformly at
random in all states where this makes sense (when actions a and b are available), and to
play deterministically action c in all states where c is available.
This gadget allows, by plugging in n2 a game with known payoffs (the games on the next
subsection), to check that the payoff at s0 has some particular value (which depends on that
after n1).
5.2 Counting modules
We now present games that generate a family of Nash equilibria with a particular expected
payoffs. These modules will later be plugged at node n2 of game Gt, and will ensure that the
payoff of an Nash equilibrium in Gt will have a predefined form.
I Lemma 11. Consider the games of Fig. 8. For n ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, define
rk(n) =
(
1, 4− 1
kn
, 4 + 1
kn
)
s(n) =
(
1, 4− 1
n+ 1 , 4 +
1
n+ 1
)
Then the set of 0-optimal Nash equilibrium values is {s(n) | n ∈ N ∪ {∞}} in D, and
{rk(n) | n ∈ N ∪ {∞}} in Ck for all k ≥ 2.
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in
q0
0, 5, 3·S
·cc
(a) Input gadget G initM
q s·6=
δ1
δ2 δ3
δ4
·δ1δ1
·δ2δ2
·δ4δ4
·δ3δ3
(b) Game GqM (where {δ1, ..., δn} is the set
∆q of transitions leaving q)
δ
q′
1, 4, 4
·6=k+1
·=k+1
(c) Game GδM when
δ = (q, dec(k), q′)
δ
Grk+1
q′
s0
n
(d) Game GδM when
δ = (q, inc(k), q′)
δ
Gr2
s0
n
Gt
s0
n1 n2
q′ C4−k
(e) Game GδM when δ =
(q, zero(k), q′)
δ
Gr2
s0
n
Gt
s0
n1 n2
q′ D
1, 4, 4
·=k+1
·6=k+1
(f) Game GδM when δ =
(q, !zero(k), q′)
Figure 9 Description of the subgames GqM and GδM.
6 Undecidability proof
We now turn to the global undecidability proof of the constrained-existence problem in
three-player games. The proof is a reduction from the recurring problem of a two-counter
machine. We encode the behaviour of a two-counter machineM as a concurrent game GM,
which connects the various subgames depicted on Figures 9 (one initial gadget, one per state
q, one per transition δ). Roughly, this game will encode a configuration (q, c1, c2) ofM using
a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ S from q such that Eσ(φ | s) = (1, 4 + 12c13c2 , 4− 12c13c2 ) (property
P (q, c1, c2)). Using the various constructions we have made previously, we can show that
if P (q, c1, c2) is satisfied, then there is a transition (q, c1, c2)→δ (q′, c′1, c′2) inM such that
P (q′, c′1, c′2) is satisfied as well, which allows to progress ‘along’ a Nash equilibrium while
building a computation inM.
The correspondence betweenM and GM is made precise as follows:
I Proposition 12. The two-counter machineM has an infinite valid computation if, and
only if, there is a 0-optimal Nash equilibrium from state in in game GM.
This immediately entails:
I Theorem 13. We cannot decide whether there exists a 0-optimal Nash equilibrium in
three-player games with non-negative terminal-reward payoffs.
We now consider several extensions of this result. We first state two straightforward
corollaries. First, applying Lemma 10, we can enforce the 0-optimality constraint in the
game by inserting an initial module. It follows:
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s (x, y, 8− y) s vx,y
x, 1, 0
x, 0, 1
My
My
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
=M3 =M4 =M5
Figure 10 Transformation of a terminal node (x, y, 8− y) with an intermediate node vx,y. The
table on the right gives the value of My for some values of y (notice that My ⊆My′ when y ≤ y′).
I Corollary 14. We cannot decide whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in three-player
games with (possibly negative) terminal-reward payoffs.
Now we realize that in this reduction, there is a 0-optimal Nash equilibrium from in
if, and only if, there is a Nash equilibrium with social welfare larger than or equal to 9,
where the social welfare is defined as the sum of the expected payoffs of all players. As an
immediate corollary, we get:
I Corollary 15. We cannot decide whether there exists a Nash equilibrium with some lower
bound on the social welfare (or with optimal social welfare) in three-player terminal-reward
games with non-negative payoffs.
We now explain briefly how the main theorem can be extended to terminal-reachability
payoffs. We indeed realize that the payoffs of players 1 and 2 always sum up to 8 in the
reduction (the game between those two players is zero-sum). The idea is then to replace each
terminal state with a simple gadget in which the payoffs of players 1 and 2 are (8, 0) or (0, 8),
and to use an adequate set of actions which decomposes runs into two sets with proportions
mimicking the normal rewards of the terminal state. For instance, for a reward (x, y, 8− y),
the set of actions My = {·ij | ∃0 ≤ r < y. i − j = r mod 8} will lead to (x, 8, 0) and its
complement to (x, 0, 8), as illustrated on Fig. 10. In the game from vx,y, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium which consists in playing uniformly at random for both players, yielding a
payoff of (x, y, 8− y). It remains to normalize and replace each (x, 8, 0) (resp. (x, 0, 8)) by
(x, 1, 0) (resp. (x, 0, 1)).
I Corollary 16. We cannot decide whether there exists a 0-optimal Nash equilibrium in
three-player games with terminal-reachability payoffs.
Finally, (roughly) by dualizing reachability and safety conditions, we can prove that the
constrained existence of Nash equilibrium in safety games cannot be decided. This is to be
compared with the fact that there always exists a Nash equilibrium in safety games [10].
I Corollary 17. We cannot decide whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in three-player
safety games with payoff 0 assigned to Player 0.
7 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have shown the undecidability of the existence of a constrained Nash equilib-
rium in a three-player concurrent game with terminal-reachability objectives. We believe this
result is surprising, since it applies to very simple payoff functions, and with very few players.
This result has to be compared with the undecidability result of [13], which on one hand,
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applies to turn-based games, but requires 14 players and the full power of terminal-reward
payoffs. Furthermore, in turn-based games with terminal-reachability payoffs, constrained
Nash equilibria can be computed (in polynomial time) through a reduction to pure Nash equi-
libria [12] and algorithms for computing pure Nash equilibria [13]. We have also mentioned
a couple of interesting corollaries that we do not repeat here.
This work lets open the decidability status of the constrained-existence problem in
two-player games with terminal-reward and terminal-reachability payoffs. In fact, even
the existence of Nash equilibria in such games is an open problem: it was believed until
recently that there are two-player games with nonnegative terminal rewards having no
Nash equilibrium [3, 13], but the proposed example was actually wrong (as we explained in
Section 3.4). If one can find such a game with no Nash equilibrium, then our Corollary 14
extends to nonnegative terminal-reward games, and possibly to terminal-reachability games.
Notice that two-player games have been studied quite a lot in the literature, and we know
for instance that (uniform) -Nash equilibria always exist in terminal-reward games [16, 17].
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